Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1983

Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales And State Insurance
Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah And
Second Injury Fund : Brief of Respondent
Industrial Commission of Utah And Second Injury
Fund

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Frank V. Nelson, Gilbert A. Martinez, and Stevan W. Julian;
Attorneys for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Rhodes Pump Sales v. Utah Indus. Comm'n, No. 19163 (1983).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4084

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALVIN G. RHODc.S PUMP SALES
and STATE INSURANC~ FUND,
Plaintiffs/appellants,

Case No. 19163

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Derendants/respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND
SECOND INJURY FUND
Frank v. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Second Injury Fund
and Utah State Industrial
Commission
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: 533-5286
Gilbert A. Martinez
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-5800
Steven W. Julian
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1538
Cedar City, UT 84720
James R. B1ack
Attorney for Appellants
Black & Moore
500 Ten Broadway Building
Sait LaKe Ci~y, UT 84101

Ff LED
AUG 111983

am. Suptom• Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALVIN G. RHODt.S PUMP SALES
and STATE INSURANC~ FUND,
Plaintiffs/appellants,

Case No. 19163

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Derendants/respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND
SECOND INJURY FUND
Frank v. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Second Injury Fund
and Utah State Industrial
Commission
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: 533-5286
Gilbert A. Martinez
Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-5800
Steven W. Julian
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1538
Cedar City, UT 84720
James R. B1ack
Attorney for Appellants
Black & Moore
500 Ten Broadway Building
Sa1t LaKe City, UT 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
~

NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPuSITION BY TtlE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL •

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT I
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE • • • • • • • • •

3

ARGUMENT II
CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN SETTLED CANNOT BE
REOPENED SO AS TO GIVE INSURANCE CARRIERS
REIMBURSEMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

3

ARGUMENT III
MEDICAL EX.l:'ENSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO AN
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT ARE A CONTINUING
OBLIGATION OF THE EMPLOYER/INSURANCE
CARRIER • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

8

ARGUMENT IV
ALCOHOLISM IS NOT A PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT
COV~REU UNDER SECTION 69

9

CONCLUSION

3

l'.AIC.1NG CERTIFICATE

10

-

i -

AUTHORITIES CITED
Statutes Cited
Utah Cooe Annotated §35-1-69

8

Utah Cooe Annotated §35-1-18

6

Cases Cited
Intermountain Health Care y. Ortega , 562 P.2d 617

4, 7

,.I,..n_..t...
e..._rm..,.o.._u...n.._t..,a....1....
· n..__.s.....
m.,,e..,.l...,t..,.i...,n...,g~c...
oA.r..,p.._._y......._.-'C...,a,...p....i...,t..a...,nU<o , 61 O P. 2 d
•••••••••
634

4

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi
631 P.2d 888 (1981)

3

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Bilanzich

8

Kincheloe y. State Insurance Fund , 656 P.2d 440
( 1982) • • • • • • • •

3

Pacheco y. Kaiser Steel and the Ind. Com. of Utah ,
118896 filed 7/18/83 • • • • • • •

4, 5, 6

Paoli y. Cottonwood Hospital , 656 P.2d 420 • • •

4

Sabo's Electronic Seryice y. Sabo , 642 P.2d 722
( 1982) • • •
• •••••••

3

USF&G y. Anderton , 647 P.2d 754 (1983)

8

White y. Industrial Commission , 604 P.2d 478

4

- ii -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALvIN G. RHOD~S PUMP SALES
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiffs/appellants,

Case No. 19163

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
and SECOND INJURY FUND,
De~endants/respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH AND
SECOND INJURY FUND
NATURE OF THE CASE
The issue is whether the State Insurance Fund,
insurance carrier for Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales, can, after
the insurance carrier and the employee have reached an
agreement, bring in the Second Injury Fund for reimbursement
for pre-existing impairment.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Respondent accepts the statement on the "Disposition
by

the Industrial Commission" as in Appellant's Brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks that the Order of the Industrial

Commission be affirmed except that there should be no award for
pre-existing alcoholism.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Applicant was injured in an industrial accident on
May 1, 197tl. (R-107)
18,

197~.

(R-24)

He had a back and disc operation on May

On July 23, 1980 the employee and the State

Insurance Fund, insurance carrier, entered into an agreement
whereby the employee received a rating of 20% permanent total
disability for his back injury and for which he received
$6,676.80 (R-jl) based on Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook's report dated
7/16/80. (R-52)

Because ot recurring medical problems the

employee petitioned for a hearing for additional benefits on
the theory that his condition had become worse since the
settlement date. (R-131)
the

ba~k

A medical panel met and it concluded

problems had not changed from the original 20%

permanent partial impairment (R-132) and the employee, therefore, failea to meet his burden of proof.

The panel did,

however, say that part of the 20% was pre-existing because of
an earlier industrial accident while working for the same
employer, the employee's brother. (R-107) The Order denied the
insurance carrier apportionment from the second injury fund
under Section 35-1-69 because the case had been settled. (R-1321
The medical panel also gave a 5% pre-existing permanent
partial impairment because of alcoholism. (R-121) The 20% back
plus 5% for alcoholism combined to 24%.

In the "spirit of

settlement" the Second Injury Fund agreed to pay the 4%
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additional for the chronic alcoholism.

The insurance carrier

is now seeking reimbursement for monies paid under the
settlement agreement because the recent medical panel
attributed part of the 20% back impairment to a previous
industrial accident employee incurred while working for same
employer.
ARGUMENT I
THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSION IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The

Ord~r

of the Industrial Commission must be

confirmed when supported by substantial evidence and reasonable
interences to be drawn therefrom.
As stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631
P.2d BBB (19BlJ, and reaffirmed in Sabo's Electronic Service
y. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (19B2), and in Kincheloe y. State
Insurance Fund, 656 P.2d 440, (19B2), the scope of review in
Industrial Commission cases is limited to:
[W)hether the Commission's findings are
"arbitrary or capricious," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence" to support them. Only
then should the Commission's findirrgs be
displaced.
ARGUMENT II
CASES WHICH HAVE BEEN SETTLED CANNOT BE REOPENED
SO AS TO GIVE INSURANCE CARRIERS REIMBURSEMENT.
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The arguments in the Brief of the State Insurance
Fund and their citation of cases are simply not relevant to
cases which have been settled.
Interm 0 untain Smelting C0 rp. y, Capitano, 610 P.2d
634, Wbite y. Industrial Commissi 0 n, 604 P.2d 478 and
Intermountain Health Carey. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617, are said
by appellants to be controlling.

Appellants Brief page 9,

These cases are not only not controlling, they have
no relevance in the cited parts to any settled cases.
The State Insurance Fund, page 9, also says, "As of
July 23, 1980, no medical evidence of Mr. Rhodes' pre-existing
permanent partial impairment was available to plaintiffs."
Their case must fall as does the statement itself.

They were

the insurers ot the same employer for both industrial
accidents.

Their doctor told them the first accident was still

causing Rhodes' trouble at the time of the second accident.
The citation of Paoli y. Cottonwood Hospital, 656
P.2d 420 by appellants has no merit.

In .Eil..P.l.i.. it was

necessary for the Second Injury Fund to be a party because the
case had not been closed and an award was made against the
fund.

In this case, as in hundreds of other cases, the Second

Injury Fund is not made a party when cases are settled.
In the recent case of Pacheco y. Kaiser Steel and
the Ind. C0 m. of Utah, tl8896 filed 7/18/83, the claimant's
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attorney requested that interest of 8% be added to the award
that had been made by the commission pursuant to a previous
settlement that had been made between the employer and
employee.
This court in denying interest that was not included
in the settlement said:
In the present case, the parties reached a
settlement betore the Commission made any
findings or decision as to the liability of
Kaiser Steel or the amount due in claimant's
case. The Commission's statement that the issue
of interest should be "settled between the
parties at the time any compensation agreement
is negotiated" is, in effect, a determination
that, as a matter of law, the interest provision
of §35-l-/ij does not apply to settlements unless
the parties provide for interest payments in the
settlement. Pacheco v. Ind. Com, supra.
In the present case a similar determination was made
by the commission:
No reimbursements are due to the State
Insurance Fund based on the additional 4% of the
whole man rating since all questions concerning
the Applicant's condition were resolved as of
July 23, 1980, unless an increase in permanent
partial impairment due to the accident was found
by the Medical Panel, which, of course, the
Medical Panel did not find. (R-132, .133)
This court continues in the Pacheco case and
distinguisnes between an award by the Commission and a
settlement:
Unlike an award, a settlement involves no
faccual determination by the Commission of
liability or the amount of damages. In view of
this d1btinction, we cannot presume that the
-5-

Legislature intended the interest provision to
apply to settlements. We think that if this
were the Legislature's intent, it would have
expressly included settlements in the section.
Pacheco v. Ind. Com., supra.
The State Insurance Fund, as of July 23, 1980, agreed and paid
all compensation and medicals although they were aware of the
previous accident as they were the insurer for the same
employer.
To allow an employer/insurance carrier to seek
reimbursement by reopening previously settled cases by showing
pre-existing impairments would open the gates to litigation in
literally hundreds ot supposedly settled cases.
In this case, the Industrial Commission of Utah
assumed continuing jurisdiction under Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.,
as amendea, to determine whether or not the injured employee's
permanent physica1 impairment due to the May 1, 1978,
industrial incident had increased above the 20% permanent
partial impairment settled on between the employer and the
injured worker, pursuant to their agreement of July 23, 1980.
The Inaustrial Commission did not assume jurisdiction to
disturb or reopen the settled agreement entered into by the
employer/insurance carrier and the injured employee, for that
was considered a binding agreement as between the insurance
carrier and the employee.

As in Pacheco, both parties, the

employer or employee, must be estopped from withdrawing or
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altering their lega1 obligation as stipulated under their
earlier compensation agreement as in this case where the Second
Injury fund was not made a party to said settlement.
The facts of the present case are especially
siguificdnt.

The settlement was made on the basis of the

report or Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, orthopedic specialist, retained
by the insurance carrier to make the examination.

Dr. Holbrook

specifica1ly detailed the earlier accident of August 15, 1977
and even stated Rhodes was still having trouble from the first
accident at the time of the second accident.
He notes that 8/15/77 he was putting a pump in a
water we1l.
He had finished the job the next
day.
He went to work, went to the doctor
8/15/77 so probably it was about two days
earlier than that when he hurt his back in 1977.
He went to Dr. John Emo in Cedar City.
He said
to take a couple of weeks off. He had not
gotten okay but he went back to work.
He had
then been going to the chiropractor rather
regularly but may haye been getting a little
worse prior to the episode of 5/1/78."
(Empnasis aaded.) (R-55)
The doctor concluded his report to the State
Insurance Fund by saying:

"He has a 20% permanent physical

impairment relative to his back." (R-56)
The evaluation of Dr. Holbrook was dated July 16,
1980.

On July 23, 1980, the settlement was made between the

State Insurance Fund and the employee.
It is a1so of significance that the settlement date

ot July, 1980, was considerably after Intermountain Health
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Carey. Ortega, (March 25, 1977) which case dramatically
liberalized access to reimbursement.
The State Insurance Fund made settlement with
knowleage ot a prior industrial accident.

They, more than any

insurance carrier in the state, acted at the time of the
settlement agreement with knowledge and understanding of their
legai position.
ARGUMENT III
MEDICAL EX~ENSES ATTRIBUTABLE TO AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT ARE
A CONTINUING OBLIGATION OF THE EMPLOYER/INSURANCE CARRIER.
In this case both the employer and its insurance
carrier, the

s~ate

1917 and the

197~

Insurance Fund, were the same for both the
industrial accidents.

Any medical expenses

associated and incurred because of those accidents are the
continuing ooligation of the employer/insurance carrier.
See Kennecott Copper Corp. y. Bilanzich, USF&G y.
Andertun, 647 P.2d 754 (1983).
ARGUMENT IV
ALCOHOLISM IS NOT A PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT
COVERED UNDER SECTION 69.
nin the spirit of settlementn it was offered to pay
4% disability caused by alcoholism. (R-152)
Alcoholism is not a pre-existing impairment covered
under §35-l-b9 u.c.A. 1953.
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All the arguments pertaining to not reopening a case
after settlement apply to the award of 4% for alcoholism.
The case was closed as to any claim for compensation
for alcoholism as pre-existing, the industrial accident of May
1, 197ti, by the settlement of July 23, 1980.
CONCLUSION
The Oraer of the Commission denying reimbursement from
the Second Injury Fund should be affirmed.

The State Insurance

Fund chose a course of action, probably because they were the
carrier in both accidents, that at the time the settlement was
made, served their best interest.

There would be no end to

such litigation if all settled cases of workmen's compensation
could be reopened for possible reimbursement by showing some
pre-existing impairment.
DATED this

_J[Jti_

day Of August, 1983.

Assistant Attorney General
Tax and Business Regulation Div.
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